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ABSTRACT 
An important part of human intelligence, both historically and operationally, is our ability to 
communicate. We learn how to communicate, and maintain our communicative skills, in a society of 
communicators – a highly effective way to reach and maintain proficiency in this complex skill. 
Principles that might allow artificial agents to learn language this way are incompletely known at present 
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– the multi-dimensional nature of socio-communicative skills are beyond every machine learning 
framework so far proposed. Our work begins to address the challenge of proposing a way for 
observation-based machine learning of natural language and communication. Our framework can learn 
complex communicative skills with minimal up-front knowledge. The system learns by incrementally 
producing predictive models of causal relationships in observed data, guided by goal-inference and 
reasoning using forward-inverse models. We present results from two experiments where our S1 agent 
learns human communication by observing two humans interacting in a realtime TV-style interview, 
using multimodal communicative gesture and situated language to talk about recycling of various 
materials and objects. S1 can learn multimodal complex language and multimodal communicative acts, a 
vocabulary of 100 words forming natural sentences with relatively complex sentence structure, including 
manual deictic reference and anaphora. S1 is seeded only with high-level information about goals of the 
interviewer and interviewee, and a small ontology; no grammar or other information is provided to S1 a 
priori. The agent learns the pragmatics, semantics, and syntax of complex utterances spoken and gestures 
from scratch, by observing the humans compare and contrast the cost and pollution related to recycling 
aluminum cans, glass bottles, newspaper, plastic, and wood. After 20 hours of observation S1 can 
perform an unscripted TV interview with a human, in the same style, without making mistakes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most useful skills to evolve in humans is the ability to communicate, which serves 
the function of transferring compressed information between individuals and groups. The skill 
builds on several co-dependent sub-skills and abilities, such as auditory timbre discrimination, 
sequence learning, fine motor control, and context-sensitive abstraction, whose evolution and 
honing over tens of thousands of homo sapiens generations has lead to the diverse use of 
communication observed in modern human society. The best – and possibly only – way to 
learn communication for a human is through observation of social interaction, where the effect 
of language use on oneself and other language users occurs naturally (cf. Petit et al. 2012), 
with practical needs and constraints driving the learning; where vast numbers of successful 
and unsuccessful uses of language variations can be related to one’s own and others’ goals, 
where numerous exceptions and contextualized cues for usage help define and hone the 
meaning of concepts and utterances, and where explicit and implicit usage "experiments" of 
communicative devices can be made directly. If our aim is to create an artificial agent that 
masters the numerous facets and subtleties of human communication this is probably the case 
as well: The agent should be situated in some kind of social context, where it can acquire the 
necessary skills through the same means. This would, however, require a new kind of machine 
learning, one that could not only observe and imitate what other agents do but that could also 
penetrate the agents’ goals, so that the learning could be derived from a deeper understanding 
of the agents’ intentions, allowing the observation to unlock the methods others use for 
achieving their goals. While no principles for such a mechanism have been fielded as of yet, 
our work proposes a way to achieve this.  
We present results from experiments with a new type of architecture and methodology 
aimed at the deep questions of autonomous acquisition of communicative skills. The approach 
relates closely to other challenges in artificial intelligence, such as life-long learning, 
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continuous adaptation, and self-programming (Nivel et al. 2013); the focus in this paper, 
however, centers on communication. Our experiments situate our system in a realtime social 
interaction similar to a television interview – a domain selected due to its inherent properties 
of relatively high complexity and real-world constraints. Even more importantly, the multi-
layered structure of social interaction – both ontologically and temporally, with sounds 
forming words, words and gestures forming utterances, utterances forming speech acts, and 
speech acts and turntaking structures forming social scenarios – includes challenges for which 
no satisfactory solutions exist at present. Our system learns situated multimodal 
communication using a single learning mechanism – no separate learning methods, modules, 
or other exceptions are needed for the various aspects of the scenario, such as gesturing, 
gesture-speech coordination, word order, question-answer paring, turntaking, and the like.  
Based on a new constructivist methodology (Thórisson 2009, 2012) that puts the autonomy 
of the agent as a main priority, we target systems that can bootstrap their learning from very 
primitive beginnings. This type of system has the highest potential for adaptation in light of 
radical changes, both to their own processing resources, their tasks, and their operating 
environment (cf. Thórisson 2013). For this reason we do away with allonomic1 approaches to 
software development, on which all common software development methodologies are 
currently based (where the human programmer provides a system with its algorithms), and 
replace it with a self-programming approach in which the majority of the system, upon 
reaching maturity, consists of code produced by the system itself. At present, an intelligent 
agent in our framework is provided with a small seed consisting of an object ontology, a 
handful of top-level goals, and optionally a couple of domain-related goals to help with the 
bootstrapping  (five, in the case of the TV interview). Due to our agents being situated in a 
social interaction scenario and being engineered to learn continuously, their knowledge is 
acquired incrementally over time, growing directly and solely from their own experience. 
Figure 1. The realtime interaction between a human (interviewer, right) and the S1 agent (interviewee, 
left), in the form of a simple TV interview conducted in the virtual equivalent of a video conferencing. 
Live tracking of the human’s multimodal behavior and speech directly drives the behavior of the avatar; 
S1 controls the other avatar via a software API. On the virtual table between the human and S1 are six 
objects of various materials; the interviewer’s role is to get the interviewee to tell about the recycling of 
these materials, and the comparison of cost, pollution, etc. of creating objects from scratch versus 
recycling objects of the same and different materials 
                                               
1 'Allonomy' is the opposite of autonomy; allonomic controllers may impart some level of autonomy to what they 
control while not being autonomous themselves.  
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The paper is organized as follows. We first give a short introduction to the theoretical 
foundation of our work, then we describe the framework we have developed, followed by a 
description of how this system learns communicative skills by observation. We then describe 
the two experiments we have run, and the results from these.  
2. METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION 
To construct highly adaptive systems means we must let go of the idea that we, the designers, 
provide the system with domain- and task-specific algorithms, as this would mean that we 
would have to pick the most important tasks the system is to perform, and proceed to codify 
by hand all information and relevant algorithms the agent is to follow – clearly a condition in 
conflict with the goal of autonomy. Our approach therefore requires us to rule out allonomic 
software methodologies – methodologies that fundamentally rest on hand-coding of domain-
level operational functionality. High levels of autonomy means high levels of domain 
independence, so we also cannot allow ourselves to provide the system mainly with domain-
specific knowledge. Instead we focus, in constructivist fashion, on developing general 
principles to allow the system itself to invent algorithms. And we must go even further, for 
high levels of autonomy means that the system we target must constantly be learning, by 
training itself on appropriate tasks and subtasks, also after it “leaves the lab”. As it turns out, 
the term “algorithm” may not be entirely appropriate for what our autonomous system is 
learning, because even on sequential repeats of the same task the system may be modifying 
how it does it (cf. Wang 2006), from the smallest to the largest subtask. In fact, in our 
constructivist approach the system development task becomes that of designing a meta-control 
scheme that, instead of providing hand-coded solutions to specified tasks and subtasks, must 
give the system enough flexibility and initiative to propose subgoals on its own, based on the 
drives (highest-level goals) provided by the system's designers, and model its experience in a 
way that continuously increases its ability to explain (by prediction) both its own behavior and 
that of its environment. 
Our constructivist AI methodology (CAIM) is outlined in Thórisson (2012, 2009), in Nivel 
& Thórisson (2009) and in Thórisson & Nivel (2009a, 2009b); here we give a quick overview 
as relates to the present work. CAIM sprang out of two separate threads that are co-related. 
The first is the view that intelligent beings construct their own knowledge from experience. 
Sure, inborn principles guide human learning, but evidence suggests that producing effective 
thinking requires interplay between a mind and its environment. This observation is where 
Piaget’s constructivist proposal originated, and his theory of cognitive stages (Piaget 1950). 
The second is a view of autonomy that sees intelligence as an extreme form of adaptation 
capabilities, a view that sees any intelligent system equipped not only with the ability to 
follow rules, but to figure out the rules. Defining mechanisms of human minds, such as the 
ability to discover, understand and abstract facts and causal chains, to make analogies and 
inferences, and to learn a large amount of vastly different skills, some of which are historically 
brand new (cf. space walks, Internet browsing, and flying airplanes), make it clear that 
providing knowledge up front for these skills takes more than inventing effective algorithms 
for a few specific tasks – it requires something more general. Paraphrasing Wang’s (2004) 
analogy, to get generality a small set of hand tools won’t do, what we need is a hand.  
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The meaning of autonomy is defined in part by the handling of obstacles; greater 
autonomy means that a better handling of obstacles, in arity, time, and/or complexity. A major 
source of obstacles for natural intelligences is the complex, nondeterministic nature of the real 
world, and numerous resource constraints that prevent actors from being able to spend infinite 
amounts of time thinking. The world has an ever-ticking real-world clock, and energy 
constraints limit natural computers (brains) to re-structuring themselves into topologies that 
are supported by the laws of physics. In fact, physical constraints are the reasons for why 
intelligence arose in the first place. Limitations of computation mean that an embodied agent 
situated in a complex environment can neither be assumed to process every input available in 
its environment nor to follow every thought to its ultimate conclusion: Real-world agents do 
not have the resources to accomplish all the jobs they ideally should or could, given their 
goals, due to limited computing and memory capacity. The assumption of limited resources 
has fundamental implications for our approach and the design of our auto-catalytic, 
endogenous, reflective control architecture AERA. Similar to Wang's NARS (Wang 2011, 
2006), our approach centers on assumptions of self-bootstrapping from incomplete knowledge 
and insufficient resources (Thórisson 2013, Nivel et al. 2012, Wang 2011). 
Pure resource-bounded autonomous constructivist systems do not exist yet in practice, but 
our system may be the purest to date, and almost surely is the first one that has been 
implemented and thus capable of providing evidence for the practicality of this otherwise 
theoretical stance.  
3. PRINCIPLES FOR ACQUISITION OF COMMUNICATIVE 
SKILLS 
Our approach to knowledge representation has its roots in non-axiomatic term logic and 
model-driven reasoning. Since knowledge in our agent is established on the basis of 
experience, truth is not absolute but can only be established to a certain degree and within a 
certain time interval. In our approach the simplest term thus encodes an observation, and is 
called a fact (or a counter-fact indicating the absence of an observation). A fact carries a 
payload (an observed event), a likelihood value in [0, 1] indicating the degree to which the 
fact has been ascertained and a time interval in microseconds, the period within which the fact 
is believed to hold (or, in the case of a 'counter-fact', the period during which the payload has 
not been observed). Facts have a limited life span, corresponding to the upper bound of their 
time interval. Payloads are terms of various types, some of which are built in the running 
system, the most important of these being sensory input, prediction, goal, command, 
success/failure, internal inputs (traces of the system’s execution, enabling reflectivity), and 
performance measurement. Additionally, any of these types can be pre-defined by the 
system’s programmer. 
Except when the agent is in initial stages of bootstrapping (which should only happen once 
for each new environment or domain), a lot of its knowledge will be composite, that is, 
relationships and combinations between small "atomic" knowledge "bricks". In the case of 
natural language, sentences are structured out of sequences of words, with fairly complex 
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relationships and rules (generally called 'grammar'); words are constructed out of phonemes2 
(and letters, which have a rather complex relationship to phonemes).  
To extract such knowledge from observing language-using humans in the real world the 
agent must have the ability to work with partially correct hypotheses about the "rules"3 that 
guide the process of constructing a sentence with a particular meaning. To this end a language-
learning agent would need to represent its experience as contextualized knowledge structures 
of some kind, with variable levels of complexity, which would allow it to change the 
relationships between the knowledge structures previously acquired in various ways at various 
levels of granularity. For instance, an incorrectly represented abstraction of how to pair nouns 
and verbs so that others understand what we mean might be eradicated when more examples 
of the various ways of its pairing are observed. The speed would be dependent on the 
efficiency of the agent's processes for this purpose, and this is our task here: To implement a 
system that can produce the necessary hypotheses for how its body and its environment works 
– in our case how natural language is used – and representing it in a way that allows 
modification to move the system towards increased accuracy. In this respect our work is 
compatible with e.g. that of Dominey & Boucher (2005), who demonstrated a robot learning 
language from limited domain and language-specific knowledge; our work goes further by 
proposing general principles for extracting meaning from observation, as described below (see 
also Nivel et al. 2014, 2013).  
With an aim of generality we wanted to find a representation amenable for representing all 
kinds of experience; one that could be used for reasoning operations, and that would scale well 
by growing with vast amounts of cumulated experience – a homogenous representational 
scheme. Knowledge in our approach is composed of what we call facts (be they past, present, 
predicted, desired or hypothetical) and of executable code – called models. Models can 
generate new knowledge, for example predictions, assumptions, and goals, and are executable, 
executed at runtime by a virtual machine, the Executive. Our models are of low granularity, 
referred to as peewee-size (see Thórisson 2012, Thórisson & Nivel 2009a), each comparable in 
size to a SOAR’s production rule (cf. Laird 2012).4 Low granularity better supports 
knowledge plasticity than high granularity since modifications of small parts are less likely to 
have detrimental, unforeseen side-effects, and makes is easier to add/remove small parts than 
bigger parts, since this does less to the system. Their semantics are also simpler, and each 
one’s effect on the entire system is easier to trace. Furthermore, peewee granularity means that 
higher levels of combinatorics are leveraged.  
Representing time is of course necessary for producing timed behavior; for natural 
language time must be manipulatable at several scales, from large-scale composite operation 
(e.g. achieving a mission such as doing a TV interview) to intermediate-size actions (e.g. what 
utterance will elicit a desired answer/information from an interlocutor) to the smallest levels of 
individual operations (e.g. producing a prediction). This pervasion of time is a necessary 
                                               
2 'Phoneme' is a construct hypothesized by humans; here it is used as shorthand for the already-categorized sounds 
that can be used to convey meaning in a human natural language in a modular way. Our agent is of course not 
bound to such human-hypothesized concepts, as it generates its own knowledge based entirely on its own 
experience and capabilities, provided a small seed to bootstrap the process. 
3 The effective ("correct") use of natural language might be formalizable as explicit rules, but natural language is 
primarily a vehicle for getting things done, and as such may not be so unlike any task with complex contextual 
dependencies and relationships between its atomic operands.  
4 While our models bear a similarity to production rules in their surface structure, having e.g. a right-hand side and a 
left-hand side and directly supporting reasoning, significant differences exist in other respects, including our models 
fusing forward and inverse control modeling supporting simultaneous and parallel forward-backward chaining, and 
a deep representation of time. 
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requirement of any system that must (a) perform in the real world and (b) model its own 
operation with regards to its expenditure of (temporal) resources. Considering time values as 
intervals allows us to encode the variable precision and accuracy needed to deal with the real 
world, for example, sensors do not always perform at fixed frame rates and so modeling their 
operation may be critical to ensure reliable operation of their controllers and models that 
depend on their input, and the precision for goals and predictions may vary considerably 
depending on both their time horizons and semantics. Last, since acquired knowledge can 
never be certain, one can assume that "truth" – asserting that a particular fact holds – can only 
be established for specific periods with varying degrees of temporal uncertainty. 
4. SITUATED COGNITIVE CONTROL 
Being equipped to learn natural language in situ in a social situation requires an artificial agent 
be endowed with many complex cognitive functions, including – among others – the ability to 
direct its own attention to the right things at the right time (cf. Helgason et al. 2014, Ognibene 
et al. 2013, Helgason et al. 2012, Demiris & Kadhouri 2006), relate spoken words and sounds 
to contextual actions and cues (cf. Dindo et al. 2010), and to interpret the behavior of co-actors 
as dependent on its underlying goals and intentions (cf. Pezzulo 2012, Dindo et al., 2011, 
Dennett 1987). As it bootstraps its language knowledge (from possibly meager beginnings) it 
needs to be capable of classifying events based on its own incomplete knowledge of the world 
at any point in time, in a way that it can easily update its knowledge based on gained 
experience.  
In our approach, communicative learning, planning, and action execution are emergent 
processes that result from the same set of low-level processes: the execution of fine-grained 
programs that are automatically generated, are reusable, and are shared system-wide, 
collectively implementing functions that span across the entire scope of the system’s operation 
in its environment. The most prominent program in our system is a model. A model is the 
fusion of one forward and one inverse model, according to the common terminology of control 
theory (cf. Wolpert & Kawato 1989), and generates both goals and predictions; some other 
programs monitor their success or failure and are thus able to reinforce the system’s 
confidence about their effectiveness. Hierarchies of models represent composite knowledge 
and skills. The acquisition of hierarchies ameliorates attention by improving the agent’s ability 
to anticipate, thus driving information acquisition more closely in line with contextual cues.  
Knowledge in our system is operationally constructive: Models represent the causal 
relationships between observed events, be they external (sensory, i.e. reflection of the 
environment's states) or internal (reflection of the system's own states and operation): These 
are the tiny elementary executable constructs (procedural knowledge) that implement the 
system's ability to predict and to act in a domain. Learning a skill consists of learning models 
and their context and sequence of execution. A single model has three roles, (a) enabling 
predictions about what “may happen next”, (b) suggesting specific ways to achieve a goal and, 
(c) making up assumptions, i.e. that while not having been observed, assert with some degree 
of confidence that some facts should hold given the current knowledge accumulated by the 
system. As practiced in control theory, hierarchies of low-level forward-inverse models (our 
models) constitute controllers that specify behaviors addressing environments of higher levels 
of complexity. Hierarchies also compress knowledge: The execution of models is a first class 
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input and captures in an abstract form (trace of computation) an otherwise complex state 
specification. Models thus contribute to build up increasingly abstract relationships, grounded 
in the internal system's operation ranging from surface perception/actuation complexes, to 
deeper (system-wise) operational semantics. At any point in time in a running system all 
currently relevant models are executed simultaneously in both of these roles, in parallel, in 
vast quantities in order to narrow down the system's options. Judgment of the system’s 
performance relies on the continual self-assessment of its models' performance, and this 
controls learning: Learning happens continuously and is triggered by unexpected goal 
achievement or by prediction failure – learning triggering events. Upon either event, model 
candidates are assembled from the recorded history of salient inputs (inputs that proved of 
high value in the past for solving any goal pursued by the system) and fielded immediately – 
their relevancy at any point in time, as well as their lifetime, being sanctioned by their 
expected future performance. Bad models are discarded and/or replaced by better ones.  
In our view, high-level processes (planning, attention, learning) influence each other 
reciprocally. For example, learning better models and sequences thereof improves planning; 
having good plans means that a system will direct its attention to more (goal-)relevant states, 
and this means in turn that learning is more likely to be focused on changes that impact the 
system’s mission (e.g. correct identification of novelty), which on average increases its 
chances of success. These high-level processes are dynamically coupled, via the low-level 
processes, as they both result from the execution of the models. The system allocates 
computational and time resources to learning processes based on the progress of learning, i.e. 
the first derivative of the triggering events' rate. 
At the heart of our approach is the cognitive control that results from the continual value-
driven scheduling of reasoning jobs, the latter being small programs that perform the forward-
inverse execution of models, monitor the outcomes of predictions and goals and build new 
models, among other tasks. High-level cognitive processes are grounded directly in the core 
operation of the machine, giving priority to reasoning jobs that process predictions and goals, 
using two complementary control schemes, top-down and bottom-up. Top-down scheduling 
allocates resources by estimating the global value of the jobs at hand, and this judgment 
results directly from the products of cognition – goals and predictions. These are relevant and 
accurate to various extents, depending on the quality of the knowledge accumulated so far. As 
the latter improves over time, goals and predictions become more relevant and accurate, 
allowing the system to allocate its resources with a better judgment; the most important goals 
and the most useful/accurate predictions have priority, the rest being saved for later processing 
or even discarded, to save resources. In that sense, cognition controls resource allocation. The 
second control scheme is bottom-up: Resource allocation controls cognition. Should resources 
become scarce, the scheduling process dynamically narrows the system’s attention to the most 
important goals/predictions the system can handle, trading scope for efficiency and therefore 
survivability – the system will only pay attention to the most promising (value-wise) inputs 
and inference possibilities. If the resources become more abundant the system will start 
considering goals and predictions of less immediate value.   
The bootstrap code – the initial seed for the system – contains (among other things) top-
level goals (drives) and top-level models. A drive is an “innate” goal given by the 
programmer, whose semantics can also be those of a constraint; it is a goal whose payload is a 
fact that cannot be observed directly – think for example of the drive “keep operating 
successfully”: the environment does not produce explicit direct evidence of its achievement, 
but several indicators can be combined to infer it. A top-level model is handcrafted for giving 
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the system a way to entail the success (or failure) from an observable (such an observable 
could be “your owner gives you a reward”). Due to being data-driven, drives and top-level 
models form together the system’s motivation, providing a top-down impetus for the system's 
running, while sensors provide an influx of data, driving its operation bottom-up.  
A more comprehensive description of these aspects of our system, as well as others, can be 
found in Nivel et al. (2014, 2013), Nivel & Thórisson (2013), Nivel & Thórisson (2014), and 
Steunebrink et al. (2014). 
5. EXPERIMENTS WITH NATURAL COMMUNICATION 
The goal of the two experiments, E1 and E2, described here was to assess the ability of our 
first agent, S1 implemented in AERA, to learn the pragmatics, semantics, and syntax of 
human natural communication. We wanted an appropriately complex task that put a measure 
on S1's capability to autonomously disentangle a wide variety of causal relationships, 
sufficient to convince us about the generality of its knowledge acquisition and generalization 
capabilities. Human natural multimodal communication contains a wide variety of data types 
at two orders of magnitude of time. We defined a scenario that included considerable spatio-
temporal and language behavior complexity: a dyadic mock-television interview. In the 
experimental setup two humans interact for some time, allowing S1 to observe their behavior 
and interaction in realtime; S1's task is to learn how to conduct the interaction in exactly the 
same way as the humans do, in either role of interviewer or interviewee. In E1 the interviewer 
asks the interviewee to pick up objects and move them to new locations on the table between 
them (Table 1), the interviewee moves the objects as requested but does not speak – a kind of 
put-that-there with learning (Bolt 1980); in E2 the interviewer asks numerous questions about 
the recyclability of the objects on the table between them, the interviewee giving informed 
answers to these (see Table 2). In E2 both interviewer and interviewee use deictics of various 
kinds and some forms of body language (see Table 3). A category system for non- verbal 
behavior was adopted from  c rew (    ), and verbal categories from  romberg   Landr  
(1993). The transcribed records were then analyzed using Theme 5.0 (Magnusson 2006).  
The knowledge given to S1 is represented as a small set of primitive commands for its 
drivers (arm joints and speech output) and categories of sensory data (speech, prosody, and 
joints/geometry), along with a few top-level goals such as "pleasing the interviewer" 
(operationally defined as the interviewer saying "thank you" or asking a new question) and 
"getting the interviewee to speak" (operationally defined as production of speech). The full 
specification of the seed for the two experiments can be found in Nivel & Thórisson (2013).  
S1 observes the realtime interaction between the two humans in a virtual equivalent of a 
video-conference: The humans are represented as avatars in a virtual environment – to allow 
the interaction to proceed naturally, without any artificial protocols, each human sees the other 
as a realtime avatar on their screen. Their head and arm movements are tracked with motion-
sensing technology (with sub-centimeter, sub-second accuracy and lag-time), their speech 
recorded with microphones. Signals from the motion-tracking are used to update the state of 
their avatars in realtime, so that everything one human does is translated virtually instantly 
into movements of her graphical avatar on the other's screen. Between the avatars is a desk 
with objects on it, visible to both participants. This is the case in both the human-human 
condition and the human-agent conditions (agent taking either role). In both experiments we 
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had S1 observe the humans until it accurately predicted all major event types observed in the 
dialogue (~2.5 minutes for E1 and ~20 hours for E2). We then had S1 interact with the 
humans for a sufficiently long period to produce videos (~10 minutes for E1, ~15 minutes for 
E2) that could be analyzed for t-patterns (Magnusson 2000); recordings of S1 interacting in 
either role with one of the humans (same as who participated in the human-human scenario) 
thus formed the basis for data analysis. 
4.1 Experiment 1 (E1) 
The objects in E1 that the interaction revolves around are: two blue cubes, one red cube, one 
red sphere, one blue sphere. The seed containing all initial (hand-coded) knowledge consisted 
of a set of primitive commands (move hand, grab, release, point at) and a set of dimensions for 
the input space (object type, color, actor’s role, speech). The seed also includes initial 
knowledge that models the consequences of invoking the primitive commands: these models 
are for example explaining how the position of the system’s hand is affected by invoking the 
command move hand and how a hand and an object are linked together after invoking the 
command grab. The natural language used in E1 consisted of a fixed set of sentence fragments 
(see Table 1). The seed for S1 in E1 is described in greater detail in Nivel & Thórisson (2013).  
Table 1. The words and word order allowed in E1. The human participants were asked to "interact 
normally" to achieve their tasks (meaningless and nonsensical sentences – e.g. a sentence starting with 
"Take it ..." as a first sentence in an interaction, which had no prior referent for the ellipsis – did 
therefore not occur). We did not provide our S1 agent with any grammar or words in E1 
Words Word Order 
verbs: put, take 
nouns: sphere, cube 
adjectives: blue, red 
adverb: there 
determiners: a, the 
pronoun: it 
conjunctions: and, ... 
interjection (ack): thank you 
Utterance: (Part1), Part2 
Part1: take, [a | the] noun], (conj) 
Part1: take, [it | [a | the] noun], (conj) 
Part2: put, [it | [a | the] [blue | red] noun], there, ..., thank you  
(Silence of some measurable length is indicated as "..."; 
parenthesis means that an element is optional.)  
 
Results show that the performance of S1 in E1 matches the human-human scenario very 
closely, and S1 only needed to observe the humans for around 2.5 minutes before its 
performance was error-free in either role. A subsequent inspection of S1's realtime 
performance for 10 minutes, in realtime interaction with humans under the same operating 
conditions as in the human-human scenario, revealed no mistakes, restarts, or self-corrections 
in the interaction on behalf of S1 – it performed flawlessly and completely error-free. The 
system acquired and generalized interaction skills to a sufficient level to allow it to perform 
100% error-free communication of the same nature and complexity as that observed in the 
human-human interaction.  
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Table 2. Basic statistics in E1. In E1 S1 only has to observe the human interaction for about 2.5 minutes 
before it is able to predict accurately their behavior, and subsequently assume either role without making 
any errors. 
Observation Time # turns  observed # errors after observation period 
~2.5 minutes ~17 0 
 
S1 learned the sequences of orders (“take a blue cube...” then waiting for the interviewee 
to comply before adding “...and put it there.” and pointing with a finger to a location on the 
table), and it learned to do this with a series of different targets (e.g. a blue cube first, then a 
red sphere), as demonstrated by the human actors – the latter of which results from the 
hierarchization of control via model affordances. S1 identified the causal relationship between 
deictics and utterances (e.g. “there” correlated with pointing gestures) – this is an example of 
learned structural hierarchy – as well as ellipsis (“put it there”). The pronoun “it” was learned 
to identify the object that draws the most attention (in terms of learned job priority), i.e. the 
target of the most valuable goals (picking an object is a learned pre-condition on the next step, 
moving it to some location, to earn the reward) – this being an example of value-driven 
resource allocation steering cognition (and vice-versa); it matches exactly how humans used 
ellipsis in the observed interactions 
 
 
Figure 2. Example time series excerpt of interaction between human (interviewer) and S1 (interviewee) 
spanning seven seconds. In this interaction the human looks at an aluminum can and says “Tell me about 
this object,” simultaneously pointing to the can with an index finger (frames 2, 3), then rests (frame 4). 
Approx. 600 millisecs later S1 gazes at the can and replies, grabbing the can and lifting it up, “This is an 
aluminum can,” (frames 5, 6) puts it down again (frames  , 8) and continues: “The main ingredient in 
aluminum is bauxite”. This short sequence is very similar – but not identical, neither in timing nor 
movements of either party – to some sequences S1 had observed in the human-human interaction. 
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4.2 Experiment 2 (E2) 
Given the success of E1, in E2 we increased the complexity of its task as follows: The 
scenario included all communicative behavior of E1, with a considerable increase in both 
spatial and language complexity. In particular, the language component in E2 included much 
longer and more complex sentences, and both interviewee and interviewer spoke, in full 
sentences and complete communicative acts. The vocabulary was 100 words; S1 was given no 
kind of grammar, nor a list of permissible words.5 On the desk between the interviewer and 
interviewee lay a set of (virtual) objects: aluminum can, glass bottle, plastic bottle, cardboard 
box, newspaper and painted wooden cube. As before, the task of the participants is to talk 
about these objects, in particular, the interviewer's task is to ask the interviewee about the 
materials of which the various objects consist, and the pros, cons, cost, and methods for 
recycling them (Table 3). As in E1, the interviewee must understand the utterances of the 
interviewer to a sufficient degree to produce the desired actions, in this case long explanations 
about the pros and cons of recycling various kinds of materials, using deictic references, 
ellipsis, and standard human dialogue and turntaking skills (collaborative, non-overlapping 
communicative acts) (cf. Thórisson 2008, 2002). While the humans in the experiments are not 
trained actors and their behavior not stylized, their interaction was nevertheless correct in all 
major aspects – all question-answer pairs were correct and consistent. S1 thus did not have to 
deal with incorrect use of language, which would undoubtedly bring the observation time well 
above 20 hours. 
Table 3. Some examples of the unscripted sentences produced in by the human participants in realtime 
dialogue in E2 
Which releases more greenhouse gasses when produced, [an aluminum can or a glass bottle | an 
aluminum can or a plastic bottle | a plastic bottle or a glass bottle]? 
What [else | more] can you [tell, tell me, tell us, say] about [this | that | it]? 
There are many types of plastic. 
Tell [me | us] about this [object | thing | one]. 
More energy is needed to recycle a plastic bottle than a can of aluminum.  
Compared to recycled plastic, new plastic releases fifty percent more greenhouse gasses.  
More energy is needed to recycle a glass bottle than a can of aluminum.  
A glass bottle takes one million years to disintegrate completely in the sun. 
Glass is made by melting together several minerals. 
A recycled aluminum can pollutes (only) five percent of what a new [can | one] pollutes. 
Recycling an aluminum can costs only five percent of a new one. 
Compared to recycling, making new paper produces thirty-five percent more water pollution. 
This is a cube made from unpainted wood.  
 
                                               
5 Due to the number of commission errors in the speech recognizer, however, its output was filtered by the set of 100 
words. 
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The results of E2 are summarized in Tables 4 and 5, and Figures 4 and 5. In E2 S1 learned 
everything that it observed in the human-human interactions, and can perform an equivalent 
interview in either role of interviewer and interviewee.6 The full socio-communicative 
repertoire exemplified in E2, with additional complexity in deictic gestures and grammar, 
acquired autonomously by S1 after an observation period of approximately 20 hours, has been 
correctly learned, with no mistakes in its subsequent application, including timing of all 
actions (Table 4). As can be seen by comparing examples of human-S1 interaction (Figures 4, 
5) with human-human interaction (Figure 3), behavioral patterns are highly significant and 
match closely the human-human condition, both in timing and components; the larger patterns 
connecting the two parties are virtually identical; disconnected smaller patterns in the S1 
conditions indicate a slightly larger variation in these interactions than in the human-human 
condition.7 As can also be seen clearly by simple visual inspection of the resulting videos, S1 
has mastered the role of both interviewer and interviewee perfectly. T-pattern analysis 
revealed that the largest pattern consisting of non-overlapping hierarchical sub-patterns and 
found in all conditions was made up from 49 events (leaf nodes) occurring in the same order 
with statistically significant event timing similarity (p < 0.005). This largest pattern explained 
77% of the total time of the interaction in the three conditions.   
Table 4. Basic statistics in E2 
Observation time # turns  observed # errors after observation period 
~20 hrs ~8000 0 
 
Figure 3. Example of common and statistically significant patterns seen in human-human condition in 
E2, involving question-answering, head direction, and hand activity (p<.05 or better). Here, the 
interviewer first asks a question, looks at the table, then looks back at interviewee, after which the 
interviewee looks at the table and begins to answer, then looks back at the interviewer. (Legend: Hq = 
interviewer; Ha = interviewee; ask = a question is asked; h_table = face oriented towards the objects on 
the table; h_other = face oriented towards interlocutor; reply = reply is produced. Timescale is in 
milliseconds; 5:48 mins total.) 
                                               
6 Videos of the interaction can be found on www.humanobs.org and on youtube.com on channel CADIAvideos. 
7  Note that t-pattern analysis is a mechanical mathematical procedure with no semantic labels; thus, t-patterns 
produced and displayed in these figures do not reflect any natural ordering such as questions preceding answers – 
events are simply labeled events with a beginning and end. See Thórisson et al. (2013) for an in-depth description of 
the t-pattern analysis used here.  
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Figure 4. Example of common and statistically significant 
patterns seen in S1-as-interviewer condition in E2 (p<.05 or 
better). Compare this to human-human condition in Figure 
3 (see text). (Legend: Hq = interviewer; Ha = interviewee; 
h_other = face oriented toward interlocutor; at_rest = body 
is at rest; h_table = face oriented towards the objects on the 
table; reply = answer to a question is produced; ask = a 
question is being asked. Timescale in milliseconds; 6:36 
mins.) 
Figure 5 - Example of common and statistically significant 
patterns seen in human-interviews-S1 condition in E2, where 
questions are followed by a new question (p<.05 or better). 
Compare this to human-human condition in Figure 3 (see text). 
(Legend: Hq = interviewer; Ha = interviewee; h_other = facing 
interlocutor; at_rest = interlocutor at rest; reply = a reply to a 
question is produced; ask = a question is asked. Timescale is in 
milliseconds; 5:18 mins total.) 
Table 5. Summary of results obtained in Experiment 2 (E2). S1 has learned how to conduct an interview 
with a human, and can perform flawlessly in either role of interviewer and interviewee after around 20 
hours of observation, producing grammatically, semantically, and pragmatically correct utterances in 
interactions spanning minutes. Our S1 agent was not provided with any grammar or words 
 
Category 
What Has Been Learned Result 
Interview 
gross 
structure 
S1 has learned how to structure dialogue in an 
interview, as observed in the human-human 
interaction. S1 has learned roles of both interviewer 
and interviewee from observation, having been only 
provided with the top-level goals for either, and can 
perform them both. S1 also learned to use interruption 
to keep the interview within the allowed time limits.  
S1 can conduct dialogue with a human 
efficiently and effectively, as interviewer and 
interviewee, in a way that is virtually identical 
to human-human interaction. Appropriate and 
correct actions taken, given the behavior of 
either role.  
Turn-taking S1 has learned the basic skills of turn-taking from 
observation, as plainly obvious in the videos, and 
clearly demarcated in turn-taking patterns shown by t-
pattern analysis. In E2 the interview includes gestures 
and speech for both roles. Turn-taking is slightly 
slower-paced than typical human-human interaction. 
S1 efficiently and effectively takes turns, 
asking questions at the right times (as 
interviewer) and answers timed correctly (as 
interviewee). The style and action repertoire is 
precisely that observed in the human-human 
condition.  
Explicit 
manual 
deictics 
S1 has learned to use three kinds of deictics: pointing 
by finger, by palm, and picking up and putting down 
an object in synchrony with speech. Successful 
resolution of a manual deictic gesture by the 
interviewer allows interviewee to produce correct 
answer to questions, and to use it reciprocally when 
replying.  
Both the timing and form of the gestures is 
appropriate for the context. Resolution of a 
manual deictic gesture by the interviewer 
allows interviewee to place objects in the right 
location, and to pick out a referenced object 
out of the five. 
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Ellipsis Use of pronoun "it" and "the [X]" (e.g. "Take the 
cube" in the beginning of a new instruction) is 
correctly used to reference (as interviewer) / 
interpreted (as interviewee) an object mentioned 
earlier.  
S1 has learned to use ellipsis in both sentence 
interpretation and generation. Successful 
resolution of ellipsis by S1 as interviewee 
allows it to place objects in the right location, 
and to pick out a referenced object out of the 
five.  
Sentence 
construction 
S1 constructs all sentences correctly. Correct 
combination of dialogue events to allow correct uses 
of pronoun and adverb, supporting disambiguation/ 
indication of what should be done. 
S1 can construct sentences in either role of 
interviewer and interviewee, based on those 
observed in the human-human interaction. The 
sequence of words is produced using 
generalized models acquired autonomously 
from observing the human interaction. 
Constructing 
proper answer 
to questions 
When the interviewer asked a question, not only were 
the gestures and speech interpreted for the correct 
response, the reply constructed was appropriate to the 
question.  
Given the numerous valid questions that can be 
asked in E2, S1 replies with an appropriate and 
correct utterance.  
6. CONCLUSION 
We have demonstrated an implemented architecture that can learn autonomously many things 
in parallel, at multiple time scales. The results show that the AERA-based S1 agent can learn 
complex multi-dimensional tasks from observation from only a small ontology, a few drives 
(high-level goals), and a few initial domain models to support autonomous bootstrapping on a 
complex task. Human dialogue is an excellent example of the kinds of complex tasks current 
systems are incapable of handling autonomously, and to our knowledge no prior architecture 
has demonstrated comparable results (cf. Franklin et al. 2013, Laird 2012, Wang 2011).  The 
fact that no difference of any importance can be seen in the performance between S1 and the 
humans in simulated face-to-face interview is an indication that the resulting architecture 
holds significant potential for further advances, and that our methodology (Nivel et al. 2013, 
Thórisson 2012) is a way for escaping the constraints of current computer science and 
engineering software methodologies when aiming for artificial general intelligence and 
increased systems autonomy. However, in its current incarnation AERA is entirely dependent 
on observation, as learning is exclusively triggered by unexpected goal achievement, or a 
prediction that turns out to be wrong – i.e. by surprise. This limits the acquisition of 
knowledge to phenomena that are directly observable – hidden causation is difficult for the 
current system to figure out, as are other kinds of inexplicit relations (similarity, equivalence, 
etc.). Elsewhere we have argued that curiosity results from the need to overcome the 
limitations imposed by the scarcity of inputs (Steunebrink et al. 2013); we plan to expand the 
types of programs to implement a richer set of inferences from which curious behaviors can be 
devised and planned, whenever the system has resources to spare. One of the main directions 
of our planned near-future work is set toward building more prototypes to assess the generality 
and scalability of our system. 
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